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compelled to do so by the doctrine of stare decisis. It also appears that
the court missed the opportunity to limit the Cutts opinion to its own
facts as obiter dictum. Also present and missed was the opportunity to
narrow its scope by assigning credibility as a matter of law in Shearin or
at least recognizing the availability of that action on other facts.
6"
Finally, available to and never mentioned by the majority were several
possible distinctions between the two motions. 65
In light of Brooks and Bogle, it is difficult to evaluate the signifi-
cance of the Shearin holding. The danger in the court's blind applica-
tion of Cutts is that Shearin will become the same rigid touchstone in
summary judgment cases that Cutts has become in directed verdict
cases. Unfortunately, it appears that this process has already begun."
CARL N. PATTERSON, JR.
Construction Lending-General Contractor v. Lender
Any number of complex legal relationships may be generated by a
building construction project.' Even within the framework of an ordi-
nary situation with standard contracts, small factual variations can
produce very different legal consequences. The relationship between
64. Since Shearin was basically a case of contract interpretation, granting summary
judgment for plaintiff seems appropriate. See note 49 supra. However, in Shearin the
option was certainly available to deny plaintiff's summary judgment motion since two
of his affiants (the plaintiff and his friend) were interested parties. See text accom-
panying note 11 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 44-58 supra. One final distinction is particularly
troublesome. The impact of the Cutts opinion is somewhat ameliorated by the availabil-
ity of a peremptory instruction to the movant. In this procedure the jury is instructed to
find for the movant if it believes the movant's evidence. No such procedure is available
in summary judgment proceedings.
66. Shearin was decided on October 1, 1975. Twice before the end of that year
it was referred to in conjunction with Cutts concerning the propriety of summary judg-
ment for the party having the burden of proof when the credibility of his witnesses is
at issue. See Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Kingsmen Prod., 27 N.C. App. 661, 663, 220
S.E.2d 95, 97 (1975); Alpine Village, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fiu-Corp., 27 N.C.
App. 403, 405, 219 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975).
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the following situation is assumed: The owner of
the property finances the project through a lender, for example, a savings and loan
association. The owner contracts with a general contractor to build the building and
agrees to pay him accordingly. The general contractor in turn employs various subcon-
tractors and material suppliers. These subcontractors may similarly employ other
subcontractors and material suppliers. The chain of subcontracts may become quite long
on a major project.
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the construction lender and the general contractor is one that has caused
courts a great deal of difficulty. It is a relationship influenced by
statutory law, common law, equity and contract. An especially difficult
question, unresolved in North Carolina,' is what circumstances give rise
to a claim for relief by a general contractor against a construction lender
when the former has been unable to obtain payment from the party with
whom he is in privity, namely, the owner.
The owner of property who wants to erect a building thereon
normally obtains temporary financing to cover the costs of construc-
tion.' When the construction is complete, he obtains a long term loan
secured by a new mortgage on the property and pays off the construc-
tion mortgage. The construction loan is normally disbursed in
"progress payments" keyed to various stages of completion of the
project.4 The idea is that the borrower will be able to pay the general
contractor and that the contractor will pay the various subcontractors
and material suppliers in such a way that no one will go unpaid for
completed work for very long.5 Also, under this arrangement the
various parties are supposedly motivated to complete the work soon so
that they can be paid. A problem arises when the funds are somehow
diverted from flowing smoothly to their proper destination. Work
comes to a halt when payments are unreasonably delayed, and the
scramble to get paid begins. If the lender forecloses and then seeks to
complete the project without satisfying the unpaid parties, he may have
difficulty getting people to do the work for various reasons. 6 Mean-
while, the partially completed building is exposed to weather and van-
dalism.
Statutory remedies are available to the unpaid parties to the
project, but those remedies are often of no practical value. Generally
speaking, the mechanics lien law in North Carolina7 grants the claim-
ants the right to assert liens against funds payable by the owner, but not
2. Urban Systems Dev. Corp. v. NCNB Mortgage Corp., 513 F.2d 1304, 1305
(4th Cir. 1975).
3. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERALS ON REAL ESTATE
FINANCE AND DEVELOP ENT 553-58 (1976).
4. Id. at 555; Lefcoe & Schaffer, Construction Lending and the Equitable Lien, 40
S. CAL. L. REV. 439 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lefcoe].
5. The payments may not cover all of the costs of the in-place work for various
reasons, including the possibility of a retainage provision. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 439
n. 1.
6. "When work stops, the suppliers and laborers who had participated are in a
strong bargaining position. Union rules, camaraderie, and skepticism about the likely
future of the project deter others from replacing them." Id. at 456.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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against funds in the hands of the construction lender." The claimants
may also, through subrogation, enforce a lien against the land.0 How-
ever, the liens on funds payable by the owner may well be worthless, as
the owner probably was diverting funds already because of insolvency.
Similarly, the lien on the property may be valueless as it only
relates back to the beginning of construction and is probably subordi-
nate to the construction loan mortgage.10
The North Carolina statute provides no remedy against the con-
struction lender or the funds in his hands." Those funds normally
cannot be attached in a proceeding against the owner since the loan
agreement and the owner's right to the funds have been terminated by
his diversion of funds and the discontinuance of work. Lawyers for
these claimants of undisbursed loan funds have advanced various theo-
ries, mostly without success.'" In Urban Systems Development Corp. v.
8. Id. §§ 44A-17(3),-18. First tier subcontractors have a direct right to liens on
funds due to the contractor; second and third tier subcontractors may claim through
subrogation to the rights of the party with whom they dealt. Although the language of
section 44A-18(1) arguably reaches loan funds wherever they are if they are 'owed to
the contractor," id. § 44A-19, which deals with notice to the "obligor," a term which by
definition (id. § 44A-17(3)) cannot mean the lender, when coupled with section 44A-
18(6) requiring such notice, makes it clear that such a result was not intended. See
text accompanying note 64 infra.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8,-23 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The general contractor
may enforce such a lien directly.
10. Id. § 44A-10; Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 440-41. The land may be subject to
other prior encumbrances as well, for example, a purchase money mortgage. Miller v.
Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288
(1st Dist. 1965). For a discussion of priorities under the California statutes, see Com-
ment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF. L. Rnv. 331, 341-44 (1963). See also
Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem-The
"Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TENN. L. IRv. 311 (1974).
11. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 44A-17(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The lender is not an
"obligor." See note 8 supra.
12. The opinions reflect overlapping and ill-defined theories. One suspects that
only a small fraction of the cases of this type have been appealed. The following are
some of the theories advanced in cases relating to the instant fact situation: (1)
Equitable assignment theory, Pratt Lumber Co. v. T.H. Gill, 278 F. 783, 789-90
(E.D.N.C. 1922); (2) reliance theory, G.L. Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Leatherwood, 268 F.
Supp. 609 (W.D.N.C. 1967), Wahl v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Ariz. App. 90,
102-03, 467 P.2d 930, 942-43 (1970), Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wettcrling
Constr. & Realty, Inc., - Minn. -, 223 N.W.2d 418, 422 (1974), First Nat'l State Bank
v. Carlyle House, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 300, 246 A.2d 22 (Ch. 1968), Demharter v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963); (3) third party beneficiary
claim, Avco Delta Corp. Canada v. United States, 484 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1973),
Demharter v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra, Clardy v. Barco Constr. Co., 205 Pa.
Super. 218, 208' A.2d 793 (Super. Ct. 1965); (4) priority for liens over lenders'
mortgages sought based on various principles of equity, Ash v. Honig, 62 F.2d 793 (2d
Cir. 1933), J.L Kislak Mfg. Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., - Del. -, 303
A.2d 648 (1973), Bedford Lake Park Corp. v. Twelve Linden Corp., 8 App. Div. 2d 962,
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NCNB Mortgage Corp.,'3 which originated in North Carolina,' 4 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the general contractor's claims
against the construction lender which were based on detrimental reli-
ance, 5 third party beneficiary status, 6 and a trust fund theory.' 7 In
similar cases, unpaid claimants have asserted claims based on negli-
gence."" They have also sought to have the lenders estopped on equita-
ble grounds from asserting the priority of their mortgages to the claim-
ants' mechanics liens.' 9
If diversion of construction loan proceeds is to give rise to a claim
for relief against the lender, the theory the courts select is of minor
consequence since several theories could be adapted to the situation. The
equitable lien theory used by the California courts, before the legislature
intervened and eliminated it, is probably the most flexible and appropri-
ate. The California equitable lien doctrine is also the only theory that
has generated a substantial number of judicial opinions and reached a
190 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1959); (5) negligence theory, Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. West-
ern Pac. Fin. Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist, 1975),
Lampert Yards, Inc. v. Thompson-Wetterling Constr. & Realty, Inc., supra at 422-23,
First Nat'l State Bank v. Carlyle House, Inc., supra. (The writer has found no cases in
which this last theory has been successful, seemingly because the courts have not found
the duty of the lender to the plaintiffs that a negligence claim requires.) See also the
California cases discussed in text accompanying notes 22-39 infra.
13. 513 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1975).
14. Other North Carolina cases have been settled, avoiding appeals on similar
claims. Letter from Edward C. Winslow I, an attorney in Greensboro, N.C., to
Elizabeth Gibson, June 3, 1975, on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
15. 513 F.2d at 1306-07. Special circumstances, namely the allegation of an
express promise, gave rise to this claim. Reliance on the fund is generally treated as an
element of an equitable lien claim, rather than an independent ground of recovery. See
note 17 and text accompanying notes 23-34 infra.
16. 513 F.2d at 1306.
17. Id. at 1305-06. Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp., 44
Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975), was apparently not yet available
to Judge Haynsworth when he wrote this opinion. See text accompanying notes 56-62
infra. It is not clear what he meant by the California "trust fund" theory. See 513 F.2d
at 1305. He cited two cases; one, Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 216
Cal. App. 2d 433, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (2d Dist. 1963), predicated its holding on certain
contractual provisions and third party beneficiary principles and found that the loan
funds constituted a trust for the benefit of the lender and the claimants. The project
having been completed, the lender had received his benefit, and liens were granted to the
claimants. The second case, Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App.
2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965), insofar as it relates to this type of claim, is
really an equitable lien theory case, which is discussed beginning with note 22 infra. If
Judge Haynsworth intended to state the requirements for recovery under the equitable
lien theory in Urban Systems, he made an overstatement. See text accompanying notes
22-39 infra.
18. See cases cited note 12 supra.
19. Id.
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significant level of development.20 In Urban Systems, Judge Hayns-
worth alluded to the California "trust fund theory"2' without determin-
ing its applicability in North Carolina. Because of 'the degree of
development of the California theory, North Carolina can benefit from
an analysis of the California experience.
A basic statement of the California equitable lien theory is found in
the 1965 case of McBain v. Santa Clara Savings & Loan Association.
22
In McBain an equitable lien on undisbursed construction loan funds
held by the lender was granted to subcontractors who had dealt directly
with the owner-borrower.2 3  Relying on older California equitable lien
cases,24 the court stressed that the claimants were entitled to senior liens
on the fund because they had justifiably relied on the fund for pay-
ment,2 even though the complaining subcontractors made no showing
of enrichment of the lender as was made in those older California
decisions. 26  The facts that the land was heavily encumbered prior to
construction and that the owner lacked personal resources made reliance
on the fund obvious.27 The court quoted from the case of Miller v.
20. The cases are collected in Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848 (1974). See text accompa-
nying notes 22-39 infra.
21. 513 F.2d at 1305; see note 17 supra.
22. 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (lst Dist. 1966).
23. Id. at 832, 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 86. The owner apparently acted as his
own general contractor.
24. Id. at 836, 51 Cal. Reptr. at 83. The older decisions were Smith v. Anglo-
California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928) and Pacific Ready Cut Homes v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510 (1932). Another important precedent
cited was Miller v. Mountain View Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965).
25. The rule required that the borrower or the lender have induced the reliance,
241 Cal. App. 2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 83, but the court also said: "Basically it is the
fund itself and the arrangement for progress payments therefrom, created by the mutual
agreement of the borrower and the lender, that constitiutes the material inducement
.... " Id. at 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
26. See Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Fin. Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d
460, 464, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701 (4th Dist. 1975).
In the older decisions granting recovery, supra note 24, the projects were completed
with loan funds remaining and the owner in default. Assuming the value of the
completed project to be at least the amount of the loan taken out initially, the lender had
been "unjustly" enriched to at least the extent of remaining loan funds. See MeBain v.
Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 845-46, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78, 89 (1st
Dist. 1966); Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444 n. 1. See also note 41 infra.
None of the cases discarding the requirement of a surplus after completion or even a
showing of any enrichment of the lender, see text accompanying notes 32 & 35 infra,
reached the California Supreme Court, where Smith and Pacific Ready Cut were decided.
27. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 844, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 88. The system of progress
payments and inspections constituted further inducement to rely. Id. at 843-44, 51 Cal.
Rptr. at 87-88. The lack of personal finances was inferred from the inability to
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Mountain View Savings & Loan Association, 2  cited also in Urban
Systems:
29
"Where the lender has received the benefit of the claimant's per-
formance, and therefore a more valuable security for its note, it
is not justified in withholding or appropriating to any other use
money originally intended to be used to pay for such performance
and relied upon by the claimant in rendering its performance."30
The McBain court assumed that lenders are capable of preventing loan
misappropriations: "Respondent was therefore in a commanding position
to employ well known and commonly accepted. . . methods to prevent
the diversion . . . of the progress payments by the owners . ... 1
The court did not require the claimants to prove that the lender had
been unjustly enriched; indeed, there was no indication that the incom-
plete project was worth more than the amounts already disbursed from
the fund." Thus McBain gave an equitable lien on remaining funds to
any unpaid contributor to the project able to show reliance on the loan
fund.
Two subsequent cases sharpened three significant aspects of the
equitable lien theory. First, in Doud Lumber Co. v. Guaranty Savings
& Loan Associationa3 the court pointed out that reliance on the fund
may be circumstantially proved with ease.3 4 Second, Doud specifically
rejected completion of the project as a prerequisite to recovery. 5 Third,
in Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank36 California granted recov-
ery under the equitable lien theory to a general contractor for the first
purchase the land or build the building without extensive credit. See text accompanying
note 34 infra.
28. 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1st Dist. 1965).
29. 513 F.2d at 1305 n.1.
30. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 836, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 83, quoting 238 Cal. App. 2d at
661, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
31. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87. See Miller v. Mountain View
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 659, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1st Dist. 1965).
32. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444 n.ll.
33. 254 Cal. App. 2d 585, 60 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1st Dist. 1967).
34. Id. at 589, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 96. "Both Smith and Ready Cut indicated that the
necessary elements of inducement and reliance could be inferred from the circumstances
of the transaction without great difficulty and suggested that an improver's knowledge
that a construction loan had been negotiated would be sufficient." Id.
35. Id. at 592, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 98, quoting Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 664, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 292 (1st Dist. 1965). "'he
reasoning behind Smith and Pacific Ready Cut Homes is as applicable to the claimant
putting in the foundation, or the rough plumbing, as it is to the carpenter driving the
last spike. All other factors being equal the rights of one contributing to the construc-
tion should not depend on the stage thereof at which his contribution was made."' Id.
36. 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 101 Cal. Rptr. 665 (2d Dist. 1972).
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time.ar The Swinerton court held that, in the equitable lien context,38
general contractors who were independent from -the borrower were in-
distinguishable from subcontractors in relation to the lender and to the
policies behind the equitable lien.3 9
An article analyzing the California equitable lien in construction
lending cases was published after McBain.40 The authors, Lefcoe and
Schaffer, point out that although the lenders in cases in which the
owners divert loan funds have gotten a more valuable security because
of the claimants' work, they have already disbursed funds once. There-
fore they have not been unjustly enriched, 4' and there must be some
reason to force them to pay twice instead of applying any remaining
funds against the borrowers' loan liabilities.42 Lefcoe and Schaffer
discredit fault and the prevention of loan diversions as supportable
rationales for granting equitable liens.43  These commentators dismiss
the court's assumption in McBain that lenders are more able to prevent
borrowers from diverting the loan funds than are contractors and sub-
37. The appellant bank claimed that such a recovery had not been allowed before,
and the court did not disagree. Id. at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
38. Swinerton distinguished Gordon Bldg. Corp. v. Gibraltar Say. & Loan Ass'n,
247 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 Cal. Rptr. 884 (2d Dist. 1966). 25 Cal. App. 3d at 263-64, 101
Cal. Rptr. at 667-68. Gordon denied the general contractor an "equitable lien" based on
a third party beneficiary claim, a contract theory, not an equitable lien theory as dis-
cussed herein. In addition, there was no proof of reliance in Gordon. Swinerlon held
that, "Since recovery in the present case is not grounded on contract but rather on equi-
table considerations arising out of estoppel and unjust enrichment, its disposition is not
controlled by. . . Gordon." Id. at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668. But see text accompany-
ing notes 26 & 32 supra, note 41 infra. The loan agreement in Swinerton contained a
provision denying the creation of an interest in the fund in the contractor. 25 Cal. App.
3d at 266, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
39. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 668. The only possible basis of
distinction is that there are simply more parties between the lender and the subcontrac-
tors, and, hence, more possibilities for diversion of funds and a greater need for
protection of the subcontractors' rights. On the other hand, it is arguable that simply
because of the number of intervening parties, a general contractor may be more justified
in relying on a construction loan fund. Certainly it should not matter that the general
contractor's contribution may be largely of entrepreneurial and managerial effort rather
than of materials or physical labor.
40. Lefcoe, supra note 4.
41. "Unjustly enriched" is used in the traditional sense. Disbursing to the owner
according to contract can hardly be regarded as tortious behavior. RESTATEMENT O1
RFSnTurnON § 128 (1937). The lender may not have been enriched in any sense. The
term "unjust enrichment" is used liberally in the equitable lien context to indicate the
situation in which one party, the lender, has realized a gain, but another, the lien
claimant, has suffered a loss.
42. See Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 444.
43. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 442-43. Actually, prevention is only one objective of
what Lefcoe and Schaffer termed an "allocation of resources" rationale. However, if
this was the courts' rationale, prevention was certainly the ultimate objective.
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contractors.4" They also point out a number of problems with lenders'
use of bonding or the voucher system as preventive measures. 4" In fact,
a survey of California lenders taken after McBain showed insignificant
movement to more sophisticated methods of supervising loans.46 The
mere threat of equitable lien liability was apparently insufficient to
induce the drastic alterations in lending practices necessary to avoid
liability under McBain.47
Lefcoe and Schaffer suggest a different basis for decision: the
desire to mitigate losses due to delay in resuming contruction after work
has stopped." Neither the allowance nor disallowance of equitable
liens in all cases is likely to affect lenders' decisions to take over and
complete disrupted projects.4" The remedy should be limited so as not
to put the various claimants in a position to be unreasonable about
completing the work because of their possession of a claim against the
lender.50 As McBain imposes no such limitations, its rule is too
broad.5' Lefcoe and Schaffer assert that, under this rationale, equitable
liens are justified in two situations:
44. Id. at 447-48. See text accompanying note 31 supra. The Miller v. Mountain
View Say. & Loan Ass'n court mentions this proposition. 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 658-59,
48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 288 (1st Dist. 1965).
45. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 449-52. "Performance bonds" guarantee performance
of the contract; "payment bonds" guarantee payment of the subcontractors and material-
men. See G. NELSoN & D. WHrrmAN, supra note 3, at 664-65. "[Bonding companies] do
not seek to prevent losses by supervising the distribution of construction loan funds;
rather, they rely on the credit of the borrower as a source of indemnity. This much lend-
ers could do themselves. Bonding is efficient only for a lender less capable than a bond-
ing company of checking borrower credit." Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 449. Mandatory
bonding would inhibit certain small scale construction contrary to the public interest.
1d. at 450.
The voucher system calls for disbursements only upon receipt of bills for completed
work. The bookkeeping expense of paying each subcontractor is generally prohibi-
tive, and paying the borrower directly facilitates the presentation of forged bills. Id. at
451.
46. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 454. Greater selectivity of borrowers was attributed to
the then tight money situation. Id. n.48.
47. "As a determinant of lending policy, the threat of equitable liens seems
insignificant in relation to trends in the money market and demand for construction
loans." Id. at 455. One reason for the scarcity of appellate opinions may be that the
cost of litigation and appeal is simply too high compared to the amounts involved, which
tend to be small. Large projects with large costs are usually bonded, eliminating the
need for recourse to equitable liens for subcontractors and materialmen. Id. at 458 n.62.
But see notes 69-70 infra concerning general contractors.
48. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 456-58.
49. Id. at 456.
50. That is, if the remedy is allowed in all cases, the claimants are likely to get the
same compensation for what they have already done regardless of whether they resume
work. Id.
51. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
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First, when the lender forecloses and sells the incomplete project
to a purchaser who finishes and resells for a substantial profit, this
provides some evidence that the lender failed to act reasonably to
mitigate loss. In such a case the tender [sic] without a coherent
defense of its conduct (e.g., that materialmen and laborers capri-
ciously refused to stay with the job) might properly be held ac-
countable to unpaid materialmen on an equitable lien theory. Sec-
ond, an equitable lien might be imposed in order to avoid unjust
enrichment. Suppose the lender finishes after foreclosing mechan-
ics' liens and realizes a profit above normal entrepreneurial gains.
This surplus profit may be attributable to the earlier, uncompen-
sated contribution of materialmen.52
Having identified two situations in which it is clearly unfair to deny the
remedy to the claimants, the commentators also suggest that a reasona-
ble profit should be preserved for the lender.5
The liberal allowance of recovery against lenders under the rule of
McBain produced sufficient backlash to have the remedy legislated out
of existence, possibly completely. In 1967 the California legislature
enacted the following statute:
[N]o person may assert any legal or equitable right with respect to
such [construction) fund, other than a right created by direct
written contract between such person and the person holding the
fund, except pursuant to the provisions of [the California stop
notice54] chapters.55
In Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pacific Financial Corp.5 0 the
California Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the statute was
intended only to abrogate the extension of the equitable lien theory that
occurred in McBain and similar cases.57 Instead, the court construed the
new statute to abolish the equitable lien altogether 58 and expressed the
52. Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 457.
53. Id.
54. The stop notice is a device whereby the unpaid materialmen may enjoin the
lender from making further disbursements. CAL. CIv..CODE § 3162 (West 1974). See
Ilyin, Stop Noticel-Construction Loan Officer's Nightmare, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 187
(1964); Comment, California's Private Stop Notice Law: Due Process Requirements, 25
HAsTiNGs L.J. 1043 (1974). In Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d
543, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191, 200 (5th Dist. 1974), the court held the bonded stop notice
statute to violate procedural due process.
55. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3264 (West 1974). In Swinerton, a 1974 decision, the
statute was held to be prospective only and, therefore, inapplicable to the events of 1965.
See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
56. 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975).
57. Id. at 464-65, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See text accompanying notes 24-26
supra.
58. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
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opinion that the mechanics liens and stop-notice statutes adequately
provided for contractors, subcontractors and materialmen.59 Concern-
ing lenders, the court said, "[Lenders] are relieved of the expense and
risk of policing the ultimate distribution of construction funds and can
concentrate on their primary duty of providing construction loans at
lesser expense to the borrower and ultimately to the consuming pub-
lic."' 0 The facts of the case did not compel the court to decide
expressly whether a claim for relief would be stated if there were an
allegation of unconscionable enrichment of the lender.0 1 Thus the
possibility of stating a claim under the circumstances that Lefcoe and
Schaffer suggest as justifying the equitable lien remedy has not been
properly foreclosed by stare decisis62
North Carolina's courts have the opportunity to discard the worst
of the California judicial theory and to retain and improve on the best.
Development of this area of the law in North Carolina should not be
impeded by her statutory scheme because it does not treat the construc-
tion lender's relationships with other parties, 3 and because there was no
legislative intent to foreclose such development.6 4 It is noteworthy that
at the time California legislated the equitable lien out of existence, 5 that
state still provided a statutory remedy against the lender.66 North
Carolina's statute is different.6 7 Her courts should apply the equitable
lien theory as Lefcoe and Schaffer recommend: (1) to prevent lenders
from taking unfair advantage of an unpaid contractor's, subcontractor's,
or materialman's contribution by granting recovery in such, cases and
(2) to assist in minimizing economic waste by not granting the remedy in
all cases in which mere reliance is shown.6"
Beyond that application, however, the North Carolina courts
should consider applying the theory to another situation based on a
prevention rationale, but should avoid the shortcomings of a McBain
59. Id.
60. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
61. Id. at 466, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
62. See generally Lefcoe, supra note 4, at 459, in which the authors described in
their Postscript how the statute can be read to allow still the equitable lien in those cases
in which they recommended its use. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A (Cum. Supp. 1975), especially id. § 44A-17.
64. At least, such was the opinion of Professor Smith, a member of the committee
that drafted section 44A. Interview with Richard M. Smith, Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina, February 11, 1976.
65. See text accompanying notes 54-62 supra.
66. The stop notice remedy was still available. See note 54 supra.
67. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
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type of rule. That situation occurs when the claim to the fund is made
by an unpaid general contractor (rather than by subcontracators or
materialmen) who simply proves that he relied on the fund for pay-
ment. This rule would encourage the lender to see to it that the
proceeds of the loan make it at least past the owner to the next party in
the chain of payment. 60 It may be that general contractors are just as
likely as owners to misuse funds, but if the lender does his job, at least
one party would be prevented from misusing the proceeds. Further-
more, by obligating the lender to supervise the distribution of funds to
the general contractor, the first tier subcontractors are better able to
protect themselves. The funds would at least make it to the party with
whom the first tier subcontractors are in privity, or else the general
contractor would have a claim against the lender that they could attach.
Lenders should not be overburdened by this type of obligation, though
they would be by an obligation to all possible claimants to the fund.
Hopefully, unlike the McBain rule,7 this approach, limiting recovery
based on mere reliance to general contractors, would make it economi-
cally advantageous for lenders to verify that the requisite progress has
been made prior to a disbursement and to obtain the owner's agreement
to disburse funds directly to the contractor. Although it does not
inhibit diversion further down the chain of payment, this rule would
provide a reasonable measure of prevention.
Construction lending cases are difficult because of their differing
fact situations and the problem of resolving disputes between two inno-
cent parties. The California lien theory in the limited form advocated
by Lefcoe and Schaffer, as opposed to the liberal view of McBain, would
69. Any deterrence of mitigation (see text accompanying note 50 supra) caused by
liberal allowance of the equitable lien to the general contractor should be outweighed by
the prevention accomplished. Besides, it is not so difficult to find a new general
contractor if the old one is unreasonable about finishing the job.
As for the fear that deterrence of mitigation of economic waste will result (as under
the McBain rule) if subcontractors are able to obtain subrogation to the general
contractor's claim by contract or otherwise, once the duty of the lender to get the
payments to the general contractor is clear, fault becomes the controlling consideration if
the lender fails in his simple duty.
Furthermore, when there is a payment bond guaranteeing payment to all sub-
contractors, the general contractor is an indemnitor of the surety and is the only
party who really stands to lose if he has no recourse against the lender. He has no
practical means of protecting himself from diversion by the owner. When he is granted
the equitable lien remedy against the lender, and when there is a payment bond every
innocent party is protected. The lender protects himself by getting the payments to the
general contractor.
70. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The lender's cost of compliance with
this rule is lower and the threat of lien liability is larger when the general contractor is
the claimant.
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not deter mitigation of loss and would prevent the lender from making a
supernormal profit while others go unpaid. North Carolina can go one
step further and reduce the number of loan misappropriation cases
without unduly burdening lenders by granting equitable liens to general
contractors who relied on construction loan funds but were not paid for
completed work.
WILLIAm H. HIGGINS
Consumer Protection-Hardy v. Toler: Applying the North
Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation-What Role for
the Jury?
Shortly after the enactment of the North Carolina unfair trade
practices legislation in 1969,1 the hope was expressed that the state had
taken a "unique approach" to consumer protection that might well
succeed in curbing deceptive trade practices: a consumer protec-
tion statute to be enforced in large part by consumers themselves.2 For
almost six years, however, the potential of these sections had remained
1. The main provisions of the legislation are to be found in the newly created
section 75-1.1 which provides as follows:
Methods of competition, acts and practices regulated; legislative pol-
icy.-(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal
means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in
business, and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public
within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers
and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher,
owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television sta-
tion, or other advertising medium in the publication or dissemination of an ad-
vertisement, when the owner, agent, or employee did not have knowledge of
the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement and when the
newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising me-
dium did not have a direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the
advertised product or service.
(d) Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section
shall have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975). In addition, the following sections were amended
to make them applicable to all potential defendants in a deceptive trade practice action:
id. §§ 75-9, -10, -11, -12, -16 (1975).
2. See Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Caro-
lina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 911 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
